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Sartre is well known for his philosophy of freedom. According to him, man is 
condemned to be free, which means that his very being makes him free. This 
being is the pour-soi which Sartre puts in contrast with the being of the en-soi, 
the being of the world. The being of man is called by Sartre le pour-soi, in so 
much as consciousness exists for him who is aware of it. The things of the world 
are simply themselves, without any consciousness. A thing is en-soi, it is what it 
is and just what it is. By contrast, the pour-soi has no essence. It exists, Sartre 
would say, as a nothingness. This thesis is related to the definition that Sartre 
gives to consciousness. Consciousness is not an interiority, a substance in which 
some states of mind and passions reside. Consciousness is an act. The act of 
aiming at something, it is always “consciousness of something”. That is the 
thesis of intentionality, that Sartre (Sartre 2003) found in Husserl's philosophy 
(Husserl 2011, §36; §84). 
However, to these abstracts considerations on the being of the pour-soi, 
Sartre (Sartre 2011, 554) adds that freedom is always in a situation. Man is 
always in a certain place, in a certain time of his life, in certain relationships with 
others. Nevertheless, this situation is not determining anything. My connection 
with it is contingent. I could have been born elsewhere, in another family for 
example. All the same, I was born in that particular family and to ignore it is to 
think about an action abstractly whereas it is placed in concrete terms. We can 
consider that Sartre is going further than Kant by defining the free action not 
only abstractly, as “the power to inaugurate by oneself a state” (Kant 2006, 495), 
but as freedom in a given situation. Through his action, man exercises a power 
from the situation and from outside of the situation. We can say that Sartre 
completes the Kantian thought of freedom which made it exist in this world and 
only on a noumenal plane. 
Among the elements which make up a situation, there is the person's 
past. The problem that has to be solved is whether the past plays a part in 
determining the content of the action. What must be reconciled, if possible, are 
the thought of the pour-soi as nothingness and the affirmation of freedom in 
every situation. The thesis that the being of consciousness – the pour-soi – is a 
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nothingness means that it cannot have a definition pre-determined for acts. It is 
not a thing. But, there is another thesis that freedom is always present in any 
given situation. When I talk of there being freedom in situation, I am talking 
about being pour-soi.  
Is the past something which in freedom in situation is en-soi or pour-soi? 
This brings us back to the classical problem of determinism and freedom for a 
philosophy of absolute freedom which does not recognize determinism. That is 
why I have decided to focus also on the role of the past in the choice of action. 
Indeed, it is often said that one who acts in a certain way does something which 
seems like him or on the contrary when one acts in an unexpected way, that he 
acts in a way “that is not like him”. All these observations indicate that the past 
of the agent is considered as giving shape to future actions. The present action 
would be inscribed in a continuation of the past. Moreover, we could think that 
the past has not only a motivational effect, but also creates the reasons for the 
action. If I act in a certain way, it is not only because my habit, my past impels 
me, but because I have some reasons to do so, reasons that I perceive precisely 
because my past has inclined me to this. We have to wonder about the existence 
of motives and understand how they turn into reasons to act. 
1. The role of the past 
It would be ridiculous to pretend that the past did not exist. Nevertheless, to 
maintain that the past is the origin of all my actions is simply to assert that 
which came in front of what I am doing in the present. The origin does not 
necessarily have any efficient power, it is not a foundation: it is a precedence in 
the chronology whereas a foundation would be a logical precondition. To know 
the origin is to know the situation on which and from which I act. I can act 
bravely after being a coward all my life. The past is a starting point. Is not it then 
a kind of a springboard? Yes, but a springboard is not a trampoline, it is only the 
start from which I jump into the void. It is the place from which I go but it does 
not in itself add any a power to my jump. It has no force of its own. However, it 
should be viewed as a locus by reference to which one can see that an action is 
situated. My action is seen to exist in a certain moment of my life.   
Thus, the past does not play a determining role for the action nor is it its 
driving force but it enables the understanding of the action and of the agent. It 
is the frame in which I act, and from which I act as a pour-soi. I find my bearings 
in relation to it but it is only a point and it does not indicate the direction in 
which I am going. I am remote from this point and I can go in all directions. To 
believe or to make others believe that this starting point determines my actions, 
it is showing “bad faith”1. Sartre does not reject duration as a concept, but he 
rejects the determining aspect of duration. My action is always marks a clean 
                                                             
1 Originally: « mauvaise foi ». 
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break from anything that came before though I can always choose to continue 
it. 
The rejection of the determining role of the past takes the same form as 
the rejection of any determination by a situation. 
Sartre asserts that there is a “state of fact” only if a power of nihilation2 
makes it or, more precisely, reveals it. The separation of consciousness happens 
in two steps: we stop considering the actual situation as something natural and 
necessary, and instead we develop an alternative (Sartre 2011, 480). Then, we 
compare the possible situation and the actual one.   
It must be understood that what surrounds the acting subject could 
constitute a motive for acting only if the subject constitutes it as a motive. To do 
this, he has to become aware that he is not embedded in the situation, but that 
he is always separated from it by the nothingness that he is. This separation 
exists but he is not necessarily conscious of it. We can take the example given by 
Sartre: the worker of 1830 did not revolt because he lacked “the necessary 
reflection to conceive a social state in which these suffering would not exist.” 
“He suffered without considering his suffering”. His misfortune was “integrated 
to his being by the worker himself”3.  However, he was wrong. With an 
awareness, called by Sartre (2011, 480) “a pure tearing away of himself” – 
because our being may have become embedded – it becomes possible for the 
worker to set down his suffering as unbearable. In other words, the 
phenomenological description shows well the duality of the constitution of the 
motive and so the ineffectiveness of the situation as such. The first step consists 
in tearing oneself away from the world, from the being. Why is a tearing needed 
if we understand the pour-soi as the being which is not what it is, as a power of 
nothingness? The tearing enables one to be aware of this power of nihilation 
and to fight against the state of fact of myself in a figure, in a role, which prevents 
me from being what I am, that is a nothingness. The situation itself tends to 
freeze me in a role. If I allow myself to be taken in, I will be guilty of bad faith. 
Then, in the second step, it becomes possible to describe the state of fact thus 
revealed as an unbearable condition. It is then and only then that a motive for 
action exists, something that drives the actor to act. Thus there is neither the 
sociological nor the historical determinism insofar as the society is concerned, 
the social situation is a fact only if the agent is tearing himself away from it and 
gives it the sense of being unbearable. Without these two steps, the social 
structures would have no effect.  
Do they not have the negative effect, however, of preventing me from 
acting? The term `stagnation’ does not signify a complete lack of power but it 
                                                             
2 Originally: « pouvoir de ne antisation » or « puissance ne antisante ». 
3 Originally: “L'ouvrier de 1830 ne se re volte pas parce qu'il manque de «la re flexion 
ne cessaire pour lui faire concevoir un e tat social ou  ces souffrances n'existeraient pas». 
«Il souffre sans conside rer sa souffrance». Ses malheurs «sont inte gre s par l'ouvrier a  
son e tre»”. 
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ascribes to me a negative power, one that retains. We could then say that social 
structures do after all have an effect, namely that of inertia on the agent. The 
example of the worker helps correct this misunderstanding. It is not the social 
structures themselves that prevent him from acting, it is the subject himself or 
herself that prevents it, but not in a conscious way.  Misfortunes are “not 
detached, they are not seen in clear light”. But who does not tear away from 
them?  Who does not see them in clear light? It is the worker himself, and 
“consequently, they are incorporated by the worker to his being” (Sartre 2011, 
479; emphasis added). He is suffering from a poor understanding of his relation 
to the en-soi. Here, Sartre denies the efficacy of these socio-economic structures 
in so much as they are a state of fact only if the pour-soi is tearing itself away by 
its annihilating power. The responsibility therefore rests on the acting subject.  
The second part of this quote shows that it takes the same movement in 
order for the past to constitute a motive for action. One must “tear himself away 
[from the past] in order to be able... to give it a meaning”. Without these two 
steps, there is neither a determination of the action by the past, nor an obstacle 
to act insofar as, ontologically, the pour-soi is always already separated from its 
past by nothingness. “A rupture”, “a tear”. However, our past has bogged us down 
in inertia and we must tear ourselves away. In itself, a situation does not even 
make sense, it's up to us to give it meaning. Since it has no meaning in itself, it 
cannot give direction to action. It is only retrospectively that we understand the 
sense of the past, that we give it a meaning and that we can explain the action 
by a causal system. On its own the past has no power.  
The past has no power because its existence is very special: As the past, 
it has only an “honorary existence”. This qualification shows the existence of the 
past – which is not denied – but it also shows its lack of power. It serves only by 
representation, as the Queen of England only represents authority and public 
power. In fact, the Queen has no power over state affairs. Similarly, the past is 
there, it is a state that I was in, but it has no power over the current business I 
lead. Moreover, just like the Queen, the past can be unnoticed, it can be no more 
than a part of the decoration. It is like the greatness that has disappeared and is 
irrelevant to the present day because, of both not being relevant to the present 
time and because of not being in actuality. If the past remains, this is because 
we maintain it in existence. We invite the past to appear in a project for the 
future. This is because there is a project to realize that the past is called on, the 
past is chosen for the recall. It is not given to us; we are here and now and when 
it's time to act, we must confront the past. In other words, either choose to go 
in the direction that it was, to continue in the same way because this is our 
project or choose to follow a different way.  
How does the constitution of the en-soi give rise to a motive that adds 
meaning to the situation?  Does the meaning come first and only then does the 
agent plan to do something from the meaning he has been given? The answer to 
the latter question is negative. The meaning and the project are simultaneous. 
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The relation between the motive and the act should not be seen as a relation of 
cause and effect. The motive does not exist before the action. There is one 
simultaneous emergence of the motive, of the action and of the end. In other 
words, Sartre raises the possibility that a pre-motive would have a power of 
determining and triggering the action. In fact the motive has a meaning and 
exists only if there is an action and an end. The act has a meaning if there is a 
motive and an end. The end has a meaning if there is a motive and an act.  
In fact, Sartre argues that we should be more rigorous. First it seems 
that the act decides the motive and the end. And it depends on nothing other 
that freedom, which is temporalizing nihilation. I start acting when I take the 
step back that allows me to have a motive and to target an end. It is this 
nihilating distance and this donation of the meaning of the situation which 
constitute the motive and the start of action. Here, Sartre seems to have a broad 
understanding of the action. It exists when both the motive and the end exist. 
However, there is no need for the initial gestures, or physical movements. That 
is because Sartre equates “the resolute project” with the action. Here is a 
specific example: I decide to act with an environmental protection group. For 
the moment, I do not move, I am still in my office. This decision, however, is 
already an act according to Sartre, it is firstly a project to campaign for ecology 
and secondly a step back from the situation in which I am, namely a member of 
a consumer society and living without taking into account the environmental 
impact of my lifestyle. This is assuming that it is possible that I could act to 
protect the environment, that is to say at the same time considering that I could 
live differently, outside of a thoughtless consumption model, and that my 
decision is forged and I am driven to act. 
Sartre refuses to consider either the motives or the reasons as 
transcendent. They do not exist before the project does, they have a value 
thanks to the project. So it is the project that is the basis of motives and reasons. 
I do an action not because a motive exists, but because it is a part of my project 
which gives value to this motive. Thus there is no real deliberation on my part 
here since motives have the value that I give to them and when I deliberate, the 
decision has already been made. In fact, I do realize the presence of motives and 
this awareness through deliberation is precisely in my project (Sartre 2011, 
495). It is the project that gives motives their value and therefore dictates that 
the decision is made. The project concept is crucial. We should question what 
has led us to adopt such a project, to carry out such a project in so much in as it 
decides what actions are to come. Thus we wonder – has Sartre not just pushed 
the process of determination back one stage? 
Since there is no real deliberation, the will does not choose between 
choices. The decision is already made. The will therefore occurs only in 
triggering action. 
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2. The reasons for the action  
The objective characteristic of the reason is taken from the world, in the aim 
that the pour-soi has. However, the reason remains an “assessment” of the 
situation. Such is the special nature of this intentionality of consciousness that 
it can refer both practically and scientifically to the world.  In front of a field of 
flowers, the biologist will see the future possibility of seed dispersal. Looking at 
the same field, a young lover will see the opportunity to pick flowers for his 
loved one. Thus we see that the appreciation of the reason in the world is based 
on the project of the pour-soi. It is because the romantic's project is to seduce 
that he sees in the field a reason to pick flowers.  
The reason does not determine the action, “it appears only in and 
through the project of an action” (Sartre 2011, 493). The appearance of the 
reason and the fact that consciousness cut engraves it into the reality of a 
situation is therefore the result of a particular way of aiming at reality, the way 
of a pour-soi engaged in a project. This is quite subjective. It is not the en-soi 
which is the creator of the reason. The reason has a sense and thus existence as 
such only because of the being pour-soi. 
There are two theses that are rejected. On the one hand, there is the 
thesis that the en-soi or the world determines the action. It does not and to imply 
otherwise would be to say that the en-soi lacks its own being and has a need to 
be changed and in some sense completed or fulfilled. A forest destroyed by fire 
does not of itself call for replanting in so much as the fire allows its regeneration 
by the emergence of new trees. The en-soi is full of itself and its changes do not 
require outside intervention, they are the effect of a natural causality4. On the 
other hand, there is the argument that there could exist a motive that would 
make the agent perceives reasons for his action. Sartre uses an example of the 
French king Clovis. Did Clovis conquer Gaul because he was driven by ambition 
or some other pre-existing motive? Sartre replies in the negative. The king’s 
ambition was “not distinguished from the project to conquer” (Sartre 2011, 
493). This project was the motive. It was not because Clovis was ambitious that 
he wanted to conquer Gaul, but because he wanted to conquer Gaul we can say 
that he was ambitious. We find here again a theory opposed to psychologism, or 
at least to any theory which bases the source of actions in the “self”, in the ego. 
What comes first? Not the qualities of the ego, but the project. And this is the 
very being of the pour-soi according to Sartre. It is this projection that 
illuminates the world and reveals reasons. This revelation is also donating the 
sense of reason. Ultimately, it is the being-in-the-world of the agent which is the 
source of reasons, motives and ends.  
There is no act without a reason. Does this mean that the reason is a 
cause of action within the meaning of natural causality? Again, Sartre replies in 
the negative. As for the motive, we should not hypostatize the reason. The 
                                                             
4 Neither is it a question of asserting any end. 
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motive is always a motive for an agent and it should be “experienced as such” 
says Sartre (2011, 481). However, it is not necessary that the reason be posed 
by consciousness. It exists and it need not be reflected on since the object of 
consciousness is the action. As for the motive, the reason only has the value 
given it by the pour-soi adopting the project.  
If we base this thesis in Sartre's ontology we are able to understand 
what Sartre means when he says that “man is condemned to be free” (2011, 164; 
484). 
At the very moment when I try to cling to my reasons, I understand that 
I am always beyond them, always free to change, to remove their value, to escape 
from them. There is within this concept a form of responsibility which causes 
anxiety. My reasons may explain my action, but they never determine it 
completely. I am beyond them and I am the only agent. This is an absolute 
responsibility which causes anxiety. There is no action without me, therefore 
motives and reasons cannot be considered as a cause in the sense of the natural 
cause of a phenomenon. In this way Sartre's philosophy is a philosophy of 
freedom and is against determinism. Although the situation offers the agent 
some reasons to act, the pour-soi is always separated from them. In his absolute 
responsibility, he gives them meaning. Man is therefore condemned to be free. 
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Does our Past a have Motivational Effect? Our Reasons for Acting: Sartre’s 
Philosophy of Action 
 
 
Abstract. The goal of my paper is to consider how one chooses one’s own 
action. First, I will try to understand how both his past and his environment can 
condition someone's action. According to Sartre, we can act without being 
determined by our past which is always separated from us. It will be important 
to understand how such a process is possible. Is man completely free to 
act? Then I will raise the question of our reasons for acting in order to show that 
reasons do not pre-exist in the world. Motives are always motives for an agent 
who gives them meaning. They never condition the action completely.  By his 
project, the agent reveals some reasons to act and these reasons have a value 
only in relation to the project adopted by the agent. Therefore, we can say that 
everyone is condemned to be free. 
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